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PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND

school representatives. Law Day participants may attend
workshops and panel discussions on the application
process and the law school experience. PRLDEF cohosts a
similarly well-attended orientation-day program for accepted students, which consists of panels on how to succeed in law school and provides an opportunity to network
with members of various local Latina and Latino bar associations. PRLDEF has also established scholarships, Internships, and mentorship programs for law students.
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Policy Division
When PRLDEF merged with the Institute for Puerto Rican
Policy, PRLDEF's Policy Division was formed to serve the
needs of the Northeast and Puerto Rico-based Latino communities. The Policy Division turned its focus on three
program areas: policy analysis and advocacy, civic participation, and policy networking/communications. The Policy Division works on these issues in the eastern United
States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
The Policy Division organizes panels throughout the
year on such significant matters as voter participation, redistricting, and education policy. The division also publishes several policy papers on various topics, including
census analysis and socio-political matters such as Latina
and Latino political identity and political power.

Legacy
Beginning in 1972, PRLDEF filled a vacuum by litigating
and advocating on behalf of Puerto Ricans and other Latinas and Latinos in the Northeast and Puerto Rico. As a result of its litigation and advocacy efforts, dramatic changes
have occurred in employment, housing, voting, and education rights for Latinas and Latinos. From board members
to legal staff members to student interns, everyone who
has walked through PRLDEF's doors has learned leadership and advocacy skills. Many, if not most, have established themselves as leaders within the legal community.
They have become federal and state judges, administrative
law judges, law professors, and heads of city and state
agencies and bar associations. They have also been policymakers at the highest level, and have assumed elected and
appointed political offices throughout the Northeast.
Through its community lavvyering, PRLDEF has touched
the lives of Puerto Ricans and other Latinas and Latinos,
and brought the community closer to real equality and empowerment in the United States and Puerto Rico.

See also ASPIRA and Puerto Ricans.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aspira v. Board o{Educ., 58 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Centro de Estudios Puertorriqucfios. Archives: Finding Aids.
W\\'W.centropr.org/lib-arc/prldef.html
Centro de Estudios Puertorriquefios. "Research: Census 2000."
www.centropr.org/researchlcensus2000.html

·I
I

JEI\NY RIVERA

PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST UPRISING. On
October 30, 1950, in a dramatic but doomed attempt to
free Puerto Rico from U.S. colonial control, the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico carried out armed insurrections
in major towns and cities throughout the island. Under
the leadership of the Harvard-educated attorney Pedro
Albizu Campos, who was elected party president in 1930,
the Nationalist Party adopted a radical revolutionary nationalism that rejected electoral politics. Independence
would ultimately be achieved through anti-imperialist activism and armed confrontation with the U.S. authorities
and the despised colonial government. The Nationalists
believed that, as a result of continued agitation, the political costs of maintaining a colony would prove unacceptable for the United States. According to Albizu Campos:
Puerto Rico must create a grave crisis for the colonial administration in order that its demands be heard. What is needed is
a rebel organization to make a clean break with the colonial
regime and to request recognition of our independence from
the h·cc nations of the world
(Wagenheim, p. 168).

Albizu Campos was convicted of seditious conspiracy
and was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary from 1937
to 1943. He returned to Puerto Rico in 194 7 and immediately took up the cause of Puerto Rican independence. In
1949, the U.S. Attorney General labeled the Nationalist
Party a subversive organization that sought "to alter the
form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means" (New York Times, 1949). This designation
provided a legal basis for the colonial government's persecution and harassment of the Nationalists.
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The Puerto Rican Commonwealth Act
In a series of fiery speeches between 1948 and 1950, Albizu Campos excoriated the United States for keeping
Puerto Rico's people in economic bondage and perpetual
poverty. He condemned the Puerto Rican Commonwealth
Act (Public Law 600) and called on the Puerto Rican people not to register to vote in a referendum on the adoption
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PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST UPRISING
of the law. This important legislation, which was enacted
by the U.S. Congress but conceived by Governor Luis
Munoz Marin and his Popular Democratic Party, authorized the people of Puerto Rico to draw up and approve
their own constitution. This constitution would have the
trappings of a charter of autonomy under a republican
form of government but would not alter Puerto Rico's
fundamental relationship to the United States as a territorial possession subject to the unrestricted plenary powers of Congress. According to the Nationalists, Public
Law 600 was a farce that allowed the United States to report to the recently established United Nations, which
was actively promoting global decolonization, that the
Puerto Rican people were sovereign.
By repudiating the colonial administration and Public
Law 600, Albizu Campos was provoking the government
to arrest him for violating the 1948 anti-free speech law
known as La Mordaza (Law No. 53). The law made it illegal to advocate the overthrow of the Puerto Rican government "by means of force or violence." Under this law,
the colonial authorities had tremendous latitude to suppress the activities of the Nationalists and other independence advocates, who comprised a substantial portion
of the population in 194 7.

The Start of the Insurrection
The Nationalist Party had planned to begin the islandwide insurrection on November 3. The uprising would
not only disrupt the voter registration process slated to
begin on November 4 but would also possibly provoke a
crisis in authority that would compel the U.S. Congress
either to rescind Public Law 600 or to delay its implementation. The Nationalists' long-term objective was to
gain Puerto Rico's independence, but their immediate objective was to seize and retain military and political control of one or two large towns, including Utuado, for a
month. The Nationalists were convinced that, if they succeeded, the authority of the colonial government would
crumble and the United Nations would pressure the
United States to allow Puerto Ricans to exercise their
right of self-determination.
The decision to launch the attack on October 30 rather
than November 3 was made because government agents
learned of the impending insurrection and because Albizu
Campos had discovered that a "plot existed in Washington
to eliminate the nationalist leadership" (United Press). On
October 30, the Nationalist Insurrection broke out in nine
towns and cities, including San Juan, Puerto Rico's capital.
Nationalists attacked La Fortaleza, the governor's residence, in an attempt to assassinate Governor Munoz
Marin. In an attack that appeared to be coordinated with
the insurrection, two Nationalist Party members attempted
to assassinate President Harry Truman in Washington, D.C.
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Govemment Response
Munoz Marin dispatched 3,500 National Guard troops to
suppress the insurrection in Jayuya, Utuado, and Arecibo.
Police held Albizu Campos's home under siege for two
days before the Nationalist leader surrendered. The insurrection was quickly stamped out except in the mountain town of Jayuya, a Nationalist stronghold. There, the
Nationalists burned the police headquarters, overthrew
the local authorities, and for two days took control of the
town. Blanca Canales, one of the Nationalist leaders,
raised the banned Puerto Rican flag and declared Puerto
Rico an independent republic. The National Guard
launched its attack on Jayuva with heavy weapons, including mortars and tanks. Airplanes were ordered to
bomb and strafe the rebels. The National Guard recaphired Jayuya on November 1 and arrested four hundred
townspeople. According to a reporter at the scene,
"Jayuya looked as if an earthquake had struck it, with several blocks destroyed and most of the other buildings in
the town of 1,500 charred by fire" (New York Times, November 1, 1950). National Guard ground and air forces
were also deployed to suppress the rebellion in Utuado.
In all, about 140 Nationalists were active combatants in
the insurrection. The police reported that twenty-eight
people had been killed and fifty wounded during the uprising, including police officers and National Guardsmen.
Munoz Marin sought to turn public opinion against the
Nationalists by calling the insurrection "a conspiracy
against democracy helped by the Communists" (New York
Times November 2, 1950). Once the insurrection was suppressed, the reaction by the government was swift and
draconian. Law No. 53 was used as a legal tool to arrest
hundreds of individuals on the basis of their presumed affiliation with or membership in nationalist, socialist,
Communist, and independence organizations. By arresting these activists and holding them in preventive detention, the government was able to severely restrict
organized opposition to the referendum on Public Law
600. Hundreds were convicted and sentenced to prison
terms. The entire leadership of the Nationalist Party was
either killed during the insmTection or sent to prison. Albizu Campos was convicted of twelve counts of violating
Law No. 53. He was also sentenced to prison for terms
ranging from twenty-nine to seventy-eight years for attempted murder and for seeking to overthrow the government of Puerto Rico. Twenty-one Nationalists involved in
the Jayuya uprising were convicted of murdering a police
officer and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Legacy of the Uprising
In 1958, a Civil Liberties Commission issued a report on
Law No. 53 that accused the government of using the law
"under a fayade of legality ... as a dragnet to punish
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members of hated minority groups, with the crime defined
in a highly expansive manner to reduce or eliminate the
problem of proof" (Lewis, p. 344 ). The Nationalist Insurrection and Pedro Albizu Campos remain symbols of defiance to colonial domination among many Puerto Ricans.

See also Albizu Campos, Pedro; Muiioz Marin, Luis;
Puerto Rican Independence Movement; Puerto Rican
Revolutionary Organizations; Puerto Ricans; and
Puerto Rico, Colonialism in.
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PUERTO RICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS. The
history of Puerto Rico's independence movement in the
second half of the twentieth century is marked by a virtual
state of war between the FBI and the Puerto Rican
government on one side, and the Nationalist Party, the
Macheteros, and the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion
Nacional (FALN) on the other side. These Puerto Rican
revolutionary groups employed violence against government, corporate, and military targets in a campaign to
overthrow U.S. colonial rule of Puerto Rico.
Actions in the 1950s
On November 1, 1950, two members of the Nationalist
Party of Puerto Rico attempted to assassinate President
Harry Truman. Oscar Collazo and Grisello Torresola,
both residents of New York, carried out the doomed attack on Blair House, where President Truman was residing. Torresola killed one of the police officers who
guarded the residence, and two other officers were
wounded in the exchange of gunfire. In turn, Tonesola
was killed and Collazo was critically wounded, but recovered. Collazo was sentenced to death for the attempted
murder, but one week before his scheduled execution in
1952, President Truman commuted the sentence to life

imprisonment. Collazo later explained, "It was not important if we did or did not reach President Truman. That
was secondary. It was sufficient to create a scandal that
focused world attention on the colonial case of Puerto
Rico. And the assault was a success" (Fernandez, p. 182).
The second notable attack occurred on March 1, 1954,
when four members of the Nationalist Party shot at members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The attack was
led by Lolita Lebron, who shouted, "Viva Puerto Rico
Libre" before she and her associates Rafael Cancel Miranda, Andres Figueroa Cordero, and Irving Flores Rodriguez opened fire on the assembled congressmen. Five
congressmen were wounded. Upon being arrested, Lolita
proclaimed, "I did not come to kill anyone, I came to die
for Puerto Rico!" The Nationalists, who did not resist arrest, were convicted of attempted murder and other
crimes, and sentenced to death. President Truman commuted the sentences to life imprisonment. Pedro Albizu
Campos, the Nationalist Party president, who had been
pardoned for revolutionary activities in Puerto Rico,
hailed the attack as an "act of heroism." Governor Munoz
Marin revoked the pardon and Albizu remained incarcerated for another decade.
Commutations of Sentences in the 1970s
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter commuted the sentences
of Lolita Lebron, Irving Flores, and Rafael Cancel Miranda after they had served twenty-five years in prison.
Andres Figueroa Cordero was granted clemency posthumously. He had died of cancer in March 1978 after having
been released from prison because of his terminal illness.
President Carter cited humane considerations for the
commutations and said that the prisoners had served an
"unusually long time in prison" and that "no legitimate
deterrent or correctional purpose" was served by their
continued incarceration. Their release coincided with
Fidel Castro's release of several American CIA agents
being held in Cuba on espionage charges. The Carter administration denied that there were any connections. For
years, the Puerto Rican community had urged clemencv.
By 1977 a broad consensus existed among Puerto Ricans
for the release of the jailed Nationalists. Four former goYernors of Puerto Rico joined with Robert Garcia, the onlv
Puerto Rican U.S. congressman, to urge the commutations. FALN had also demanded the release of the prisoners. The governor of Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero Barcelo,
stood virtually alone in opposing the pardons granted by
Carter, stating that it would encourage terrorism and undermine public safety.
The FALN in the 1970s and 1980s
In 1974, FALN came to public attention as the latest
Puerto Rican clandestine revolutionary organization

